

BORDER SECURITY: A NATIONAL POLICY AND PLANNING IMPERATIVE

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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Following the initial seizure of Baghdad in 2003, United States and coalition forces started operations to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure and government. Plans, policy and forces were not applied to secure the integrity of the Iraqi border, principally with Syria and Iran. The United States has conducted significant border security operations in other regions of the world. Such operations share similarities and differences but shed some light on the issue. This project examines what is happening in these regions and makes the argument that the United States lacks the necessary doctrine and policy to address this critical issue.

BORDER SECURITY: A NATIONAL POLICY AND PLANNING IMPERATIVE

At the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May of 2003, the United States was not poised to provide for the integrity of the Iraqi border. Border forces were destroyed or had deserted. Foreign fighters, arms, and supplies would flow at a steady rate across Iraq's border and would fuel an insurgency that is still being continued by United States and coalition forces.

The assessment from *The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq* dated September 6, 2007, states border security in Iraq is not much better now than it was at the end of major combat operations in May of 2003. Below is the commission's assessment:

Iraq's border security forces are generally ineffective and need more equipment, training, and infrastructure before they can play a significant role in securing Iraq's borders. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor support from the Ministry of Interior. Overall border security is undermined by the division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external infiltration of the border security forces are widespread, and the borders are porous.¹

This paper will examine how the United States addresses border security when developing campaign and theater strategy. It will use historical cases to study the issue. Iraq will be the latest case, but we will also look at operations along the Afghanistan border with Pakistan in the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) and continued operations along the Serbian and Macedonian border by the United States in Kosovo, as well as other historical border conflicts and anti-infiltration operations.

This is not an argument on how to fix the current border situation in Iraq. Instead, it intends to be a systematic approach to address Joint and Interagency procedures and

using all elements of national power to build strategy for current and future campaigns where this strategic problem will likely recur.

Borders, securing borders, and operations along borders have been and continue to be extremely important to the national interests of the United States. Further thought with regard to operations in this realm is critical to success of ongoing and future operations and on borders that significantly influence these operations. The United States since the end of the Second World War has operated along and astride many international borders. These include the de-militarized zone in Korea, the Iron Curtain in Western Europe, Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now Iraq. Such activities present significant planning factors that must be addressed at the national level and analyzed using a system of systems approach to meet the desired objectives.

For purposes of this paper we will define border security as operations designed to prevent undesired infiltration of groups of 300 or less for the purposes of destabilizing, resupplying, or supporting the conduct of an insurgency or limited war where the United States is conducting either post conflict operations or nation building to meet its interests.² The paper will not address what is needed to defend borders to deter or prevent invasion by large conventional forces as we saw in both the Cold War in Western Europe and on the Korean peninsula along the Demilitarized Zone. In both of these instances most reasonable persons would say the United States successfully defended the borders. This was done in rather populous countries, and the United States allocated tens of thousands of men and billions of dollars of resources to defend those borders. We will now examine where the United States has not operated with great success along borders.

In the 1960's the RAND Corporation conducted a study of border control systems using Algeria as an example for possible development of doctrine and policy in Vietnam. RAND explored many options from surveillance, air interdiction, barrier systems, to strong points for observation as well as maintenance of border patrol troops. Some of these measures were put in place but without a central focus, and this lack of focus and piecemealing of resources did not produce the results of stopping the flow of infiltration into South Vietnam. RAND drew the following conclusions:

RAND's conclusions on the importance of border security echoed those of the French earlier. After extensive computer modeling of infiltration, one study commented, "*In the absence of a border security system that at least hinders or deters the enemy from determining freely his desired infiltration rates, no model solution leads to conflict termination*".³

When operating in countries or regions where civil or para-military forces would typically secure a border and these forces are not available or their actual effective capability is irrelevant, the United States must take action to secure the border assuming the host country agrees. This is situationally dependant on the current stability and self-governing ability of the nation state and its desire for our assistance.⁴ Areas where the state has failed or is very weak are ripe for an insurgency, and areas along borders are weak points that insurgents may use to their advantage. This is especially true in the initial or final stages of an insurgency. Maximizing the ability to rapidly transit a weak border may allow the insurgent the ability to escape military pressure or complicate operations for his opponent.⁵ This concept is addressed briefly in *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, The Department of Defense's new concept that "encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism".⁶

In The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of March 2006 President Bush discusses the criticality of conflict intervention, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁷ Developing joint doctrine and policy that specifically addresses border security to support the aforementioned subjects would meet vital national interests as well as foster thought and guide planning processes in pre-conflict situations no matter in which spectrum of war the conflict is waged. Regardless of the effective functioning level of a nation state there must be some level of local governmental or military institutions capable of effectively policing borders and preventing cross border infiltration for any success in counterinsurgency. If these institutions do not exist or are not functioning in a capable manner, planners must develop processes to resource and train indigenous force to a level of capability that meets the task.⁸ To do this the United States must look at irregular warfare with a global perspective from the onset.

Irregular warfare will be fought not only within a single country or region, but increasingly will be waged on a global scale. While some conflicts may occur in a single country or region, the globalization of emerging transnational threats requires that U.S. joint forces, working in concert with their inter-agency and multinational partners, prepare for multiple, comprehensive, and coordinated irregular warfare campaigns across multiple theaters of operation⁹

This doctrine must be designed using the above mentioned concepts as well as the principles of border doctrine that David Galula describes in his *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. These principles address areas where borders would allow instability, crime and at its worst stages an insurgency. Should the United States conduct stability operations, peacekeeping or counterinsurgency to meet its national interests, it must take into account the international borders where it is operating. Galula's argument is that history has shown that borders can be weak points and can

be exploited by adversaries. Greece, Indochina and Algeria are prime examples where borders were exploited and used to great advantage by insurgents. In an analysis of a country, military planners or policy makers must take into account the geography of the country. A country that has long borders and is isolated by large areas of rough terrain will enhance the opportunity of insurgents to use geography to their advantage. Iraq's deserts, Afghanistan's mountains and the rough terrain along the borders in the Balkan countries are prime examples of this rough uninhabited terrain providing excellent locations for cross border re-supply for crime, exploitation, and insurgency.¹⁰ The United States itself has a huge porous border that has great economic and social impact on the vital interest of the United States. However, this paper will not address United States border issues

Kosovo Border Area

Kosovo is surrounded by border areas that influence the current operations of United States military forces. The United States military as part of the NATO forces in support of Kosovo Force (KFOR) operates along the borders between part of Serbia and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. United States forces continue to operate along the borders to stop illegal movement of arms and smuggled goods. U.S. engineer units from the 1st Infantry Division used demolitions to emplace obstacles to reduce this cross border infiltration during the initial stages of United States operations in Kosovo. U.S. Army forces currently reinforce and assist Kosovo indigenous border security forces when needed.¹¹

In this context United States forces rely primarily on interagency coordination, especially with the U.S. State Department and international organizations such as

NATO and the European Union. *Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept* calls for this to enhance capabilities to conduct irregular Warfare. To obtain the “ends” of Kosovo’s predicament, the United States in the region must consider these “ways”:

The Ways central idea of this concept is the joint force will conduct protracted regional and global campaign against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeating them through direct conventional military confrontation. Irregular Warfare emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support. Unified action by the United States government and its strategic partners is essential to winning an irregular campaign. While the direct application of military power may not be the primary means of winning irregular war, joint forces will often be required to support non-military instruments of power and set the conditions for strategic success¹²

The area is also of vital interest to Europe and the European Union. Kosovo is in the ripe underbelly of Europe, and is historically a cross roads for illegal transit of international terrorism and crime. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has created more than 5,000 kilometers of international borders that sit astride a region that has had significant social unrest resulting in major insecurity especially amidst current United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) operations.¹³ Though border violations and transit issues at the present time do not affect the vital national interest of the United States, they do play a significant role in affecting the United States forces that are operating in support of UNMIK and Multinational Brigade East (MNB-E). This area was fully recognized after the Balkan wars as being a huge European and international concern due to the significantly increased levels of illegal migration, human trafficking, and transnational crime. The area is becoming an increased threat to the European Union because of the unabated transit of these social problems.¹⁴

This area perfectly demonstrates the crossing or blurring of traditional categories of operations as described in *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operational Concept (JOC)*. It is an area that combines the attributes of a minor counterinsurgency with those of an area undergoing nation building, irregular warfare, and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO). NATO has a vested interest in the security of the border areas in Kosovo and provides some of the assets to secure the border. While Kosovo border guards can handle regular traffic and use new technologies to detect the movement of both terrorists and criminals, these border guards cannot handle the gangs that operate in the Albanian, Kosovar, Macedonian, and Serbian areas. These gangs can attack and influence the border crossing areas with AK-47 assault rifles and rocket propelled grenade launchers. It is thus necessary for NATO KFOR units to assist in the security of the border areas.¹⁵

It is important as addressed in FM 31-55 that US and UN forces work with the host nation. Even though Kosovo is not a UN sanctioned nation, it does have a governmental framework that can work. Providing resources and training from U.S. forces produced a border force good enough to allow the draw down of U.S. forces to a level of a Brigade minus.¹⁶ From a United States perspective it is desirable to have a stable Southeast Europe. Kosovo and its nationalistic and frustrated youth will continue to provide a source of concern for the European Union and will continue to highlight the importance of the area.

As recently as 8 November 2007 hostilities in the largely ungoverned area of northwestern Macedonia was still a cause for concern as Macedonian forces conducted operations to seize weapons from an armed criminal group. Even though they are

labeled a criminal group by the Macedonian authorities, they appear to operate more like a guerrilla movement wearing black uniforms with what appears to be planned operations to meet their purposes in order to control the terrain on their side of the Macedonian border via the use of informal check points. The NATO led peacekeeping force and Kosovo police forces are conducting combined operations as well as liaison with Macedonian security forces to coordinate operations to increase control of the Kosovo-Macedonian border.¹⁷

Not only is border security in the region difficult, it crosses the conceptual lines between Joint Operating Concepts across the spectrum from terrorism, crime, counterinsurgency, stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO), peacekeeping, law enforcement, and civil military operations. Such situations reinforce the need for a holistic approach with many competing groups and demands on what has in fact become a government in itself ruled by UN Security Council resolution and United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) forces.¹⁸ One excellent example of this is travel documentation that is not readily accepted in Kosovo or Serbia. Serbia does not recognize the documentation issued to Kosovo residents by UNMIK. Though not a huge security issue for the United States, this clearly demonstrates the difficulties of operating in an area not fully governed that is struggling to build itself successfully.¹⁹ The European Union must develop conventional border security that will work in a corrupt region without providing a gateway for international terrorism and crime to flourish as has happened in other border areas of the world.²⁰

Unilaterally as this paper is submitted, Kosovo has declared independence. UNMIK remains in place, and border security issues may well escalate to conventional

cross-border attacks depending on the as yet unclear but certainly confrontational reaction of the Serbian government. Regardless, the Kosovo border serves as a good current case study for the issues addressed in this paper.

Afghanistan and Pakistan Border Regions

The Afghanistan and Pakistan border area in Waziristan along the generally unmarked Durand line between the two countries is one of those border areas in incredibly difficult terrain in “Ungoverned Territory”.²¹ The area sits astride the loosely governed areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and the struggling state of Afghanistan. After their defeat in Operation Enduring Freedom, the remaining elements of al-Qaeda and the former Taliban regime continue to operate and battle United States and Coalition forces along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border.²² Not only is the terrain difficult between the two countries, the population that lives there does not necessarily recognize the border. They only acknowledge the fact they belong to the Wazir tribes.²³

This 2,400-kilometer length of border is astride a historically difficult region to rule. The British never fully gained control of the region from the late nineteenth century to colonial independence.²⁴ The Pakistani government has attempted many times to establish positive control of the region, but state penetration into the area has had limited to no success. In fact until the 2004 offensive directed by the Musharraf government, no Pakistani military forces had operated in the FATA.²⁵ One may think that a region this remote would not make for a great area for terrorist organizations to operate, yet the amount of infrastructure that is in place to allow transit across the Afghan-Pakistani border is amazing. This infrastructure has existed since 1979 and the

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan when the structure, economy, and infrastructure was established, in large part by the United States. This infrastructure has provided the bedrock of the terrorist support network that we see today.²⁶

The area is perfect for conducting international terrorism and crime in the form of poppy smuggling. There are rudimentary phone lines and connections to financial institutions in order to allow criminal organizations to operate with relative impunity in the absence of a serious threat from a dedicated state military or law enforcement. What further complicates the problem of controlling the area and helps make it so lucrative for international terrorism and criminal activity is the presence of the hawalas, a relatively invisible remittance system that does not move actual funds and is thus very hard for intelligence agencies or law enforcement organizations to track.²⁷ The area also has internet cafes, access to postal and airfreight carriers as well as adequate satellite communications for global communications.²⁸

The concepts of the *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operational Concept (JOC)* fully recognize difficult areas like this, and the principles contained in it provide insights as to how United States forces should approach such situations. The doctrine needs to teach United States defense forces and policy makers to think along multiple lines when planning operations in a difficult and ungoverned region like the FATA. Such forward planning is especially critical to avoid having to resort to an ad hoc catch-up approach after the fact. Because of the complexities of operating in the FATA and the fact the United States must respect the sovereignty of friendly states prior to conducting operations along or across their borders, the US is taking special coordinating actions to facilitate operations without inducing counterproductive effects on the Pakistani

government.²⁹ An analysis of 9/11, and the 9/11 commission report as well as the elimination of the Taliban as the controlling regime in Afghanistan led the Department of Defense to draw new conclusions for influencing the border regions to meet United States national interests. Using special working groups for military cooperation and with standard security assistance processes, the United States has provided billions of dollars in foreign military financing to Pakistan for operations in the region. In addition to these funds, the United States supports counterterrorism and law enforcement activities in Pakistan through the State Department. These funds and activities fully demonstrate the indirect approach and unified action mentioned in *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*. Some of these activities to address the border area are construction of security roads, training of customs officials, and provision of aerial surveillance planes and helicopters.³⁰

The United States is making great inroads in regard to border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but it must continue to look at policies that will ensure the Pakistani government's support of counterterrorism, border security improvement, and intelligence sharing with regard to operations in the FATA. Furthermore it is critical that the United State develop a long-term and comprehensive support plan for increased border security and internal security in the ungoverned regions of the Pakistan border area. We should continue to measure the effectiveness of future investments in the region by their contribution to efforts to fight global terrorism and the various forms of crime that support those activities.³¹

Iraqi Border Security

Initial planning for the border security of Iraq is a prime example of the necessity to take into account Gaula's theory on counter-insurgency and the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept* on pre-operational/pre-hostilities planning. Operation Iraqi Freedom is currently the largest ongoing operation, and the most significant with regard to post conflict and counterinsurgency issues with regard to border security and the continued need for doctrine and policy with respect to this. General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.) the chairman on an independent commission on Iraq in his September 2007 report to congress eloquently states the necessity below.

Coalition forces could be re-tasked to better insure the territorial defense of the state by increasingly concentrating on the eastern and western borders and the active defense of the critical infrastructures essential to Iraq. Existing threats from Syria, coupled with the alarming increase in Iranian presence, and their combined threats to Iraq's stability, more than justify new strategic thinking.³²

Iraqi border security is incredibly important and complex. The land border is 2,268 miles in length with only 36 coastal miles.³³ A void was left after the cessation of major combat operations and the dissolving of the pre-conflict Iraqi border security, military, and secret police that operated along the border.³⁴ There was essentially no security of the Iraqi border except that provided by limited coalition forces in this region.

Before General Franks retired, Generals Abizaid and McKiernan, the Deputy U.S. Central Command Commander and Coalition Forces Land Component Commanders respectively wanted to restore some military and civil security forces to regain public order in the country and start the transition of authority to them for these tasks.³⁵ Border security would have been one of these tasks. General Abizaid fully understood that Iraq was a country of civil servants, and this service would provide jobs and allow the

country to get back on its feet. At the time, most of the border security was done by the Iraqi army--the most respected institution in the country and the one most capable of restoring order and for a number of reasons, prevent the conditions for the ensuing counterinsurgency.³⁶

Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2 abolished the Iraqi Army and started the de-Baathification process leading to great unrest.³⁷ Even though the United States national interest was to stop Iraq from spreading its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), there was no post hostilities plan to seal the porous borders and prevent this proliferation if they had in fact existed. This illustrates the lack of the doctrine and policy regarding border security as critical in military operations across the full spectrum of conflict.³⁸

The Coalition Provisional Authority on 24 August 2003 created the Department of Border Enforcement through CPA Order 26. It was not reinstated from older border security institutions, or rather the Army, but was created from scratch to its present strength of 37,710 personnel in September 2007.³⁹ Saddam Hussein performed the border function with 100,000 men.⁴⁰ This new border security institution had difficulty securing the border over a period of 4 years of a full scale counterinsurgency. The resulting porous border has been the transit zone for significant amounts of insurgent personnel and material to support the insurgency and supply the various non-state actors.⁴¹ An inefficient, post-war border force allowed foreign fighters, former Baath party loyalist, and financiers to operate from safety inside Syria. It is estimated that 75-80 foreign fighters a month are flowing across the border with allegations of training camps on the Syrian side of the border.⁴² The United States Secretary of State,

Condoleezza Rice, has conducted diplomatic discussions with Syria to address the issue of foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria. Stemming this tide would be an action louder than words. Syria states that it supports a secure Iraqi border and in theory all of Iraq's neighbors do, but they desire a different type of Iraq, and this will make diplomatic pressure in the region surrounding Iraq difficult.⁴³ Diplomatic rhetoric will not work without dedicated measures taken on both sides of the Iraq/Syria border. Not only must Iraqi border security forces cooperate and share information, United States forces must as well. There must be some tripartite form of mutual trust established between the countries of Iraq, Syria, and the United States. To truly succeed all sides must make concessions. An internet article from James Denselow eloquently highlights this.⁴⁴

If the US hopes to fully stabilize Iraq it needs to isolate the battlefield and cooperate with the country's neighbors. This means formulating a coherent policy that can prove to the Syrians that all the US is seeking is "a change in behavior and not regime" (C, Rice). The Syrian regime has neither the means nor the know-how to unilaterally secure its border with Iraq. What is required is a systems-approach to border security between Syria and Iraq/US, this encompasses regular meetings, exchanges, technical (night-vision?) and consultative working groups based on the bedrock of a mutuality of interest. However for such processes to begin both sides must stop catapulting rhetoric at each other and come to recognize the primacy of negotiations.⁴⁵

The unsecured Iraqi border also allowed munitions as well as sophisticated weapons designed to defeat coalition armored vehicles to move across the Iranian border. These munitions in particular have proved deadly to coalition forces and produce the highest amount of casualties. The United States has taken diplomatic actions with Iran with the first direct talks in 27 years taking place on May 28, 2007. However both sides continue to accuse each other regarding their roles in both the region and Iran.⁴⁶ This may be too little action too late to positively affect the outcome,

but it is a step in the right direction for a holistic approach to resolving the Iranian and Syrian border security problems.

Conditions are now better than in the immediate aftermath of the invasion; however the lack of clear military doctrine and policy regarding the immediate establishment of border security resulted in an unchecked flow of persons and material across the borders. The fact the Ministry of Interior was not disbanded after the war and instead was given the responsibility for border security may have led to many of the problems in the years from 2003 to 2007. The lack of full understanding of its responsibilities by the ministry as well as corruption has resulted in the lack of effectiveness and capability.⁴⁷

The U.S. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq uses coalition forces Border Transition Teams to assist the Department of Border Enforcement in training and operations with the majority of these advisors resourced from the Department of Homeland Security. This is a great example of some inter-agency cooperation to solve this problem. Seventy teams were identified as the requirement but just 28 Border Transition Teams were actually fielded to assist in Iraq's border security. They are mainly stationed at the critical areas along the borders of Iran, Syria, and Jordan, with the borders of Kuwait and Turkey relying on the superior relations they enjoy with coalition forces to ensure adequate border security.⁴⁸

After four years the following report made to Congress highlights the continuing need to seriously address the problem.

Conclusion: Iraq's borders are porous. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor ministerial support from the MOI. Border forces often lack the equipment, infrastructure, and basic supplies to conduct their mission. Overall border security is further undermined by

the division of responsibilities between the MOI and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external influence and infiltration are widespread. Absent major improvements in all these areas, Iraq's borders will remain porous and poorly defended.⁴⁹

Recommendation

The United States military needs to make border security planning part of the overall planning process for military operations whether for peacekeeping, nation building or major combat operations. It is evident from past performance that borders and border security and stabilizing them are vital to the national interest of the United States. It is obvious that any problem should be isolated from potential sources of support. International borders are logical places to begin such isolation. There is currently relatively little doctrine available for Combatant Command and Joint Task Force staffs to use as a guide to plan for border security in a myriad of operations that can occur in the future across the full spectrum of conflict that the United States will surely be involved in. Without doctrine, responses to future border security issues is likely to be uneven at best and deficient at worst.

As Major Bairstow describes, there are in fact few references for military, inter-agency, and political policy makers. As he so eloquently describes in his thesis, the best reference was finished in 1972 at the end of the conflict in Vietnam. This field manual 31-55 is an excellent source for one to use, though it obviously contains no consideration of the available technology of today. It does provide a base line for one to use. The major shortfall of the old field manual is that it is designed for use by the division and below. The availability of reference doctrine decreases from 1972 to the present, from the four page reference in Field Manual 90-8 published in 1986 to almost no reference of operations along borders and border security in the latest

counterinsurgency doctrine in FM 3-24 published in 2007. The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-34.471 Plumbing, Pipe Fitting, and Sewerage is 275 pages long and was updated as recently as 2001. There is a need for doctrine to address the much more critical issue of border security.⁵⁰

The United States is capable of planning detailed and effective operations along borders. The use of border cavalry in Western Europe during the Cold War and the Demilitarized zone in Korea are prime examples, though not necessarily for the same purpose as needed for SSTRO, nation building, and counterinsurgency. Building the barrier is not the mental challenge. The Cold War and the Iron Curtain, as well as the Morice line in Algeria proved with unlimited assets and a lack of moral regard for human life, denial along a border is quite possible.⁵¹ Fences and barriers are used around the world to various degrees of effectiveness. One of the most recent is the one used in Israel along various parts of their borders to guard against infiltration and reduce the proliferation of suicide bombers.⁵² From personal experience in Iraq, a wall or physical barrier provides increased security as long as it is observed. The age-old military axiom that an obstacle that is not over-watched is not effective is very applicable to this principle and reinforces the need to explore all types of solutions to the problem. The critical aspect of this is the thought and guidance provided to Joint doctrine and policy makers with regard to border security. Before entering into any military operation, Joint Force Commanders must fully consider the issue of border security. They must conduct detailed planning. It is imperative that this happens to prevent the difficulties the United States is having in the three military operations involving border security issues they are engaged in today!

The best conceptual information available is in GEN Pace's and Secretary of Defense Gates recent *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)* dated 11 September 2007 where the concept of operations in ungoverned areas, transnational threats, and Irregular Warfare is mentioned in the detail to lead one to conclusions of how to operate in these areas.⁵³ Joint Doctrine rarely mentions operations in border areas, and the subject is not addressed in any detail in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) the capstone document to provide "a common language, that serves as the foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of military operations"⁵⁴ The UJTL tasks provide a Joint Force Commander and his staff a reference document for staffs and Service components to perform operations in the interests of the United States at "strategic national, strategic theater, operational, and tactical" levels.⁵⁵ The document refers to border, or border operations only five times, with four references made to Special Operations Forces in pre-hostility cross-border operations and one mention of international borders with regard to counter-proliferation of WMD. The UJTL does not mention border security as a subject for joint force planning or training.

One area of continued refinement of *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operational Concept (JOC)* as directed by the Secretary of Defense in the document should be focused on operations around and along borders based on the argument of this thesis. The lead agencies should be US Special Operations Command and the US Marine Corps. David Galula's theory in regard to operations in border areas is on target and the examples used fully substantiate this in the areas he described.⁵⁶ Further analysis of the RAND Corporation's *On "Other War" Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* provides significant insights in regard to border security

and its incorporation into doctrine. If the doctrine existed in the DOD, there would be a greater probability of it influencing policy on military operations in the national interests of the United States. The doctrine can be based on recent lessons learned and applying the concepts of irregular war.⁵⁷ Borders and operations along borders are critical, and with the importance of all aspects of irregular war it is imperative the United States develop doctrine to address them. Systems approaches and full interagency coordination and cooperation are needed. While a kinetic plan with physical barriers may be part of the ultimate solution it cannot be the only—and perhaps not even the primary—solution.

Endnotes

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